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Abstract
To what extent has the rise of populist radical right (PRR) parties in Europe affected welfare policies? Based on 
a scoping review of studies that address the relationship between PRR parties and welfare policy, Chiara Rinaldi 
and Marleen Bekker conclude that, due to their welfare chauvinistic positions, the participation of PRR parties in 
government coalitions is likely to have negative effects on the access to welfare provisions and health of vulnerable 
population groups. This short commentary reflects on this review article and critically examines its conclusion. It 
suggests some conceptual clarifications, raises some reservations about the review’s main claim, and provides some 
follow-up questions.
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The review article of Chiara Rinaldi and Marleen Bekker1 explores the welfare policy consequences of the rise of populist radical right (PRR) parties in Europe. 
It contains 15 articles, of which 11 address the relationship 
between PRR parties and welfare policy (the other four 
seem a bit misplaced in this review as they address different 
research questions). The authors explain that welfare policy 
revolves around “redistribution of economic prosperity across 
different groups in society,” (p. 2) but they are particularly 
interested in population health and health equity; welfare 
policy acts as proxy for these variables.
Whereas far right ‘core issues,’ most notably migration 
politics, have received much attention, the impact of PRR 
incumbency on welfare policies, let alone public health, has 
barely been explored.2,3 The laudable effort of Chiara Rinaldi 
and Marleen Bekker to summarize what we know thus far is 
thus very welcome and helpful for the development of future 
research. Since research on PRR parties’ impact on welfare 
policy-making is still in its infancy, it is understandable that 
the review has an explorative character.
The review’s most remarkable conclusion is that “early 
evidence suggests that the welfare chauvinistic ideology of 
PRR parties is harmful for public health.” More specifically, 
the authors conclude that PRR parties’ welfare chauvinistic 
positions “are likely to have negative effects on the access to 
welfare provisions and health of vulnerable population groups” 
(p. 1). This short commentary critically examines and reflects 
on this conclusion. It suggests some conceptual clarifications, 
raises some reservations about the review’s main claim, and 
provides some follow-up questions. One essential element of 
the review is probably hardly surprising for many readers: it 
is by now well-established that most Western European PRR 
parties have adopted a nativist perspective on social policies 
that is called ‘welfare chauvinism.’4-6 This is a combination of 
support for economic redistribution with resistance towards 
distributing welfare services for immigrants.7 Andersen 
and Bjørklund have aptly summarized it as the idea that 
“welfare services should be restricted to ‘our own’” (p. 165).7 
Hence, PRR parties endorse redistribution, but want this 
redistribution to be restricted to the native population: they 
are favouring generosity for natives, whilst advocating cuts 
and restrictions for immigrants.4-6 In addition, some (but 
certainly not all) PRR parties, especially the Swiss SVP and 
Norwegian FrP, adopted what Simon Otjes and colleagues call 
‘economic authoritarianism.’5 This implies the viewpoint that 
the “undeserving poor” should be punished, because their 
poverty is seen as consequence of their own fault and “moral 
failing.” It is mainly targeted at “those who can work but prefer 
to live off social benefits” (p. 274).5 This includes both natives 
and non-natives, but scholars have nevertheless referred to 
such welfare retrenchment as “indirect welfare chauvinism” 
when it is motivated by the assumption that immigrants 
are overrepresented in the particular service (in this case 
unemployment benefits).8 
Several reviewed articles focus on PRR’s ideological 
positioning and indeed underline that many current PPR 
parties have increasingly adopted welfare chauvinistic views. 
Besides comparative studies of Western European countries, 
Muis
International Journal of Health Policy and Management, 2020, x(x), 1–42
the review includes case studies of Austria, Switzerland, 
Denmark, Sweden, and Finland. Remarkably, it lacks studies 
on Central and Eastern Europe, which could be an interesting 
avenue for future studies.
Another important follow-up question discussed in the 
review is whether PRR parties are successful in translating 
their preferences into public policy: does the presence of 
powerful PRR parties lead to alterations of policies? Although 
they can also influence policy indirectly, by influencing 
the positions of other parties,3 participation in government 
coalitions is considered the main channel by which PRR 
parties attempt to feed their viewpoints into the policy-making 
process.9 It therefore makes sense that the review focuses on 
the consequences of PRR parties’ participation in government 
coalitions.
Having said that, I have some reservations about the review’s 
main conclusion. One reservation stems from the fact that not 
a single study in the review includes a direct outcome measure 
of health spending or health policies. Moreover, the review 
seems to conflate the concepts of ‘population health’ and 
‘health equity.’ I would argue that it is pivotal to conceptually 
distinguish both terms. Translated to the domain of welfare 
polices: the question how much the government spends on 
welfare is fundamentally different from how this spending 
is distributed among different social groups. Generosity in 
terms of expenditure does not necessarily go hand in hand 
with generosity in terms of unrestricted, universal access to 
welfare provisions. 
The first issue at stake, which features most prominently in 
the review, is whether welfare state expenditure comes with 
limitations concerning who has access to social benefits. This 
indeed raises a different question than the issue of welfare 
spending in general: it revolves around equal rights and equal 
access. The review aptly concludes that access to welfare 
provisions of certain vulnerable population groups might be 
negatively affected by the rising political influence of PRR 
parties. Although the authors do not spell out the vulnerable 
groups and policy measures in much detail, it becomes evident 
that primarily non-natives are affected, such as refugees and 
migrants. For instance, the Danish welfare state has introduced 
a number of measures that, in principle or in practice, apply 
differently to Danish citizens and to immigrants.8,10 We 
should acknowledge the double-edged nature of PRR parties’ 
influence on welfare state policies: one would expect that PRR 
parties’ government participation results in the preservation 
of the welfare state for population groups that are considered 
‘deserving’ of such support and restriction of social benefits 
for ‘undeserving’ groups. It seems that the elderly and 
the sick mainly belong to the first category, whereas the 
unemployed and non-natives belong to the second category.11 
This idea is confirmed by interesting research by Juliana 
Chueri – not included in the review.2,9,12 Her findings indicate 
that participation of PRR parties in government coalitions 
generally lead to the adoption of welfare retrenchment 
(compared with other types of governments), but social 
expenditure on unemployment benefits and immigrants’ 
access to social rights are the main targets of cutbacks. In 
contrast, public expenditure on pension schemes is not 
negatively affected by PRR government participation, 
compared to a mainstream right-wing government. Although 
the particular coefficient is not statistically significant, the 
results suggest that PRR government participation “might 
corroborate to a lesser reduction of old-age expenditure, in 
comparison with governments of mainstream right-wing 
parties” (p. 6).2 
The main problem of the review’s conclusion is that this 
empirical confirmation of PRR parties’ welfare chauvinist 
position does not tell us very much about public health. By 
definition, this position implies the protection or expansion 
of welfare for some groups, but restrictions for others. To be 
able to relate this to “harmful public health effects” would 
requires a complex weighting of potential negative indirect 
effects on public health of migrant’s reduced access to welfare 
(eg, social assistance, healthcare) versus the potential positive 
effect of increased pensions spending (eg, lower retirement 
age). 
Even if one simply takes the total amount of governmental 
spending on welfare as proxy for overall population health, 
as far as I can tell the review does not contain an empirical 
study that demonstrates an unequivocal negative influence 
of PRR parties’ incumbency on the overall amount of welfare 
spending. In fact, interestingly, the quantitative analysis of one 
of the reviewed articles shows that the presence of PRR parties 
causes governments to refrain from welfare retrenchment.13 
In that study Leonce Röth and colleagues conclude that right-
wing, market-liberal governments with PRR participation are 
less inclined to pursue welfare retrenchment than right-wing 
governments without PRR participation.13 Hence, based on 
this particular comparison, PRR parties may in fact have a 
positive effect on welfare polices. 
On the other hand, one can indeed conclude that PRR 
parties in the government are harmful for welfare policies if 
they replace a social democratic party as coalition partner, 
as for instance happened in Austria in 2000. When Haider’s 
Freedom Party (FPÖ) joined the government with the 
conservative right (ÖVP), a long tradition of power-sharing 
between the conservative party and social democratic party 
ended. Consequently, austerity measures were more easily 
implemented.14 As scholars point out, “building a coalition 
with the FPÖ was perceived as an opportunity for the ÖVP 
to push through the retrenchment and deregulation measures 
which had been watered-down while in government with the 
social democrats” (p. 343).13 
To conclude, it is misleading to speak in a general way 
about PRR parties being “harmful for public health” without 
specifying the reference condition: harmful compared to what? 
Using the three-fold typology of Esping Anderson, I would 
expect that the PRR ideology is indeed disadvantageous for 
social policies compared with social-democratic approaches 
(eg, Scandinavia), but more generous than liberal approaches 
(eg, United States).7 On the one hand, when PRR parties 
join right-wing cabinets, they are willing to support welfare 
cuts and ‘painful reforms,’ probably to have some bargaining 
power on immigration and integration policies.9 On the other 
hand, PRR parties would ‘betray’ their electoral supporters if 
they make too many concessions in terms of market-liberal 
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positions.14 This ambivalent, in-between position on socio-
economic issues of PRR parties15 matches the attitudes of their 
voters: compared with centre-right voters, far-right voters 
more strongly support income redistribution, but compared 
with supporters of traditional left-wing parties, they more 
strongly oppose income redistribution.16
The conditional nature of welfare chauvinism — PRR 
parties oppose or advocate retrenchment, depending on 
‘deservingness’ — naturally leads to discussions about the 
meaning of social citizenship. The judgement about why 
some people deserve welfare and others not is rooted in an 
ethic of membership in a national community. As for instance 
Will Kymlicka explained, the welfare state is built on national 
solidarity; it is tied to mutual concerns and obligations we 
have as members of a shared society.17 
Regrettably, the review does not touch upon the trade-off 
between inclusiveness and feelings of solidarity (required 
for redistribution policies). Some social progressives 
are concerned that the welfare state and large-scale 
immigration — and ethnic diversity it brings — are not easily 
combined. A universal welfare state provides good social 
protection for immigrants, but is also economically vulnerable 
to immigration. If certain migrants (such as irregular labour 
migrants and failed asylum seekers) are able to become full-
fledged members of society very easily, solidary systems could 
become unaffordable and lose support. As Godfried Engbersen 
succinctly puts it: “To secure solidarity with a country’s own 
(vulnerable) citizens, others have to be excluded” (p. 2).18 Even 
the ‘universalistic’ Scandinavian welfare states intend to be 
universalistic within the boundaries of the national political 
community only.19 It should also be noted that ‘strict’ welfare 
chauvinism — banning immigrants’ access to social services— 
is rare; more commonly, “people believe immigrants should 
receive benefits after meeting some preconditions or making 
some contribution” (p. 187).12 
 Consequently, we seem confronted with a choice between 
neoliberal multiculturalism — inclusion without solidary 
— and welfare chauvinism — solidarity without inclusion.19 
The way out of this so-called ‘progressive’s dilemma’ that 
is proposed by Will Kymlicka constitutes a third option: a 
multicultural welfare state (both inclusion and solidarity).17 
But to what extent this is a realistic possibility? For the sake 
of completeness, the fourth option that can be mentioned is 
neoliberal nationalism (exclusion and no solidarity). 
The difficulty faced by the vision of a generous and inclusive, 
multicultural welfare state is that an extensive body of 
scholarship hypothesizes that immigration undermines public 
support for social policy.15 This hypothesis is not uncontested 
as research on the issue is divided.20 As Stuart Soroka and 
colleagues note: “In short, the relationship between migration 
and welfare state spending is complex” and “mediated by a 
number of factors” (such as population demographics) (p. 
176).20 They found that it is domain-dependent — particularly, 
immigration significantly decreases unemployment spending, 
but most other domains are not affected. Moreover, there are 
alternative macro-level factors that more importantly shape 
opinions of the native’s population about distributing welfare 
to immigrants.7 Especially for wealthy and well-educated 
citizens, immigration has probably a negligible effect on 
public opinions concerning the welfare state, if any effect at all. 
Even so, despite these reservations, immigration and growing 
ethnic diversity affect the opinions of the lower educated, thus 
the most ‘natural’ supporters of the welfare state.6
The progressive’s dilemma has therefore important political 
implications, as voters who are less inclined to support policies 
that benefit mostly ethnic minority groups have abandoned 
left-wing social-democratic parties in favour of radical 
right-wing parties.3,6 The left-progressive ideal of ‘inclusive 
solidarity’ is apparently not attractive for a large part of the 
traditional constituency of social-democratic parties, who 
have turned to PRR parties instead. All in all, for proponents 
of a generous, multicultural welfare approach that promotes 
health equity for all, the “million dollar question” remains 
how to convince the native working class to adjust its narrow, 
nationalist conceptualisation of social citizenship (p. 3).19
Finally, it is important to note that context matters.7 What 
makes the above-mentioned question particularly challenging 
is that it might require different answers for different national 
settings, because of country-specific factors or conditional 
effects. The review discusses several important political 
system characteristics that potentially influence the degree 
to which PRR parties succeed to shape welfare policy, such 
as the political economy and judicial institutions — rather 
confusingly, Chiara Rinaldi and Marleen Bekker hereby 
refer to ‘mediation’; the correct term for what they actually 
describe is ‘moderation’ (interaction). Besides the more 
stable institutional characteristics discussed in the review, 
immigration rates and the extent to which immigration-
related issues are salient topics in public debate might play 
a moderating role, too. For instance, the ‘refugee crisis’ 
in 2015 prompted heated debates in which immigrants 
were portrayed as cultural threat and economic burden. 
Such moderating factors could not only explain why some 
PRR parties more successfully shaped policy reforms than 
others, but also why mainstream parties in some national 
contexts more strongly support welfare chauvinism than 
their counterparts in other contexts.15 After all, mainstream 
right-wing parties have also independently adopted welfare 
chauvinistic measures, regardless of electoral successes and 
government participation of PRR parties.2,13 To conclude, 
future work could benefit from more fine-grained distinctions 
addressing the different domains and various types of welfare 
services (pensions, healthcare, child benefit, unemployment 
benefits etc) and — rather than try to ‘isolate’ the influence 
of PRR parties — more systematically explore the interplay 
of all relevant factors that determine why some citizens and 
politicians (including the mainstream ones) more strongly 
support the implementation of welfare chauvinist policies 
than others. 
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